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Abstract
Postponing a decision may allow a better decision later. However,
depending on what else comes up, there may never be a moment when
it makes sense to come back to a postponed decision, leaving poten-
tial gains unrealized. We develop a model of an agent with limited
decision-making capacity who faces a sequence of decisions that vary
stochastically in their importance and improvability. In each period he
can either act on the newly-arrived opportunity or return to one carried
from earlier. The prospect of future congestion in decisions generates an
incentive to make prompt decisions, to \keep a clear desk". The strength
of that imperative is: (1) increasing in the expected importance of future
opportunities but decreasing in the dispersion of their importance; (2)
decreasing in the expected improvability of future opportunities, but am-
biguously inuenced by the dispersion of that improvability. The anal-
ysis illuminates some decision practices that would otherwise be hard
to rationalize. Multiple equilibria in some cases rationalize persistently
dierent behavior by two agents facing (almost) identical sequences of
choices. The setting allows for a generalization of the concept of op-
tion value to congested decision environments and, by accounting for a
plausible cost to postponement of action, oers a counter-force to the
precautionary principle.
Keywords: Dynamic decision-making, limited attention, organizational
bandwidth; committees, precautionary principle, option value
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1 Introduction
\Decisions are the prevailing fabric of our daily design" according to the Hall
of Fame American Sports Journalist Don Yaeger. Both individuals and or-
ganizations face a multiplicity of situations that invite choices. Indeed some
organisms, like committees and political bodies, exist only to make decisions
on issues that appear before them.
In a business setting the serial entrepreneur and management `guru' Ram
Charan stresses the importance of the timing of decisions:
CEOs face countless decisions. The best executives understand
which ones they need to focus on. They also know when to make
a decision. And they've debated the risk of not doing it .... Any
change in the landscape creates opportunities ... but their shelf life
can be short. (From You Can't be a Wimp - Make the Tough Calls,
an interview with Ram Charan, Harvard Business Review (2013),
emphasis in original).
When decisions once made are hard to reverse it is sometimes tempting
to defer them. It is common to hear people and organizations saying that
they will \return to this issue later". An eciency rationale might be that
a better decision can be made later { that the decision is `improvable'. The
gains from postponing irreversible decisions in a setting in which choice-relevant
information is anticipated were rst formalized by Arrow and Fisher (1974)
and are captured by the notions of option and quasi-option value (Crabbe
1987). That the option value is positive provides the intellectual basis for the
precautionary principle applied in policy evaluation (Atkinson et al 2006).1
But postponement can have costs. For some decisions the benets do not
start to ow until a choice has been made. If a household without a dishwasher
struggles to decide between brand A and brand B and so opts to postpone the
choice, then the benets of owning the new appliance start owing later. Note
1In these papers choice-relevant information arrives with passage of time. An alternative
strand of research treats decision-makers as active gatherers of information. See for example
Che and Mierendor (2018) and references therein.
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that this is not simply a question of discounting: the ow of benets itself is
truncated. Similar costs can apply to delays in investment decisions by rms
(\should we locate the new production plant in city X or city Y?") and in
public policy choices. In other cases an investment or other opportunity may
have a \shelf life"{ consider a rm having the chance to be rst entrant into a
new market { such that doing it later may mean that the opportunity degrades
or even expires altogether.
Our focus here is on a dierent cost of postponement, one that arises from
constraints in future decision-making capacity. In essence, once a choice is
postponed, (a) the decision maker might never nd a time when it makes sense
to go back to it, so that the benets from action are never harvested; or (b) he
may opt to revisit it in the future, but at the expense of diverting attention from
some future choice that, considered in isolation, would have merited prompt
action.
The existence of a nite limit on the capacity to make decisions is a common
feature of many (perhaps almost all) decision environments. It is not dicult
to think of rationales at a variety of levels.
Individuals. Human beings face time constraints that limit the number of
issues to which they can productively attend (Heyes et al. 2018). Even ignoring
such constraint the concept of ego depletion and limited `mental bandwidth'
(Schilback et al. 2016, Mullainathan and Shar 2013) imply decision capac-
ity is congestible. Many studies have shown that repeated decision-making
causes decision fatigue (some cited in Amir 2008). This can substantially re-
duce decision quality, for example, among judges (Danzigera 2011), nancial
professionals (Hirshleiefer et al. 2018) and business leaders (Loewenstein et al.
2003). Various mechanisms may underpin such fatigue, including the glucose-
depleting eect of mental exertion (Baumeister 2003). Similar eects have been
found in other animals. Risk of decision fatigue leads some to develop strategies
of `decision avoidance' (Anderson 2003) and in the formal approach to decision
quality management, specic techniques have been devised to help managers
cope with decision fatigue including ensuring sucient gaps between decisions
(Saxena 2009).
Firms. The constrained decision-making capacity of a rm can be driven
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by a number of factors. The most obvious is that key decision makers, from the
CEO down, are themselves human and therefore subject to the physiological
limitations outlined above. In short, the chief executive can only do so many
things at once (Geanakoplos and Milgrom 1991).2 \In the pursuit of value
creation, people are limited by the capacity of their attention resources. When
trying to achieve a goal (create value), one person can assimilate and under-
stand only so much, reason so much, and take only so many actions in a period
of time" (page 4, Nunamaker et al. 2001). But features of an organization,
say how information ows within a rm, may themselves determine decision
capacity, and the broader concept of organizational bandwidth is increasingly
prominent. An early sketch of what it means, the limits upon it and how
those limits are sensitive to organizational design and context can be found in
Nunamaker et al. (2001) and the associated journal special issue Enhancing
Organizations' Intellectual Bandwidth to which that is an introduction.
Public and political organizations. Perhaps the most obvious institu-
tional limits on decision capacity are to be found in some public and political
bodies. Committees within organizations such as universities and school boards
are often subject to rules about the frequency and timings of meetings and the
length of their agenda (Hammond 1986). If agendas are set optimally in a
forward-looking way then, depending upon what else comes along, something
not resolved in one cycle will not necessarily command a place on the agenda
in the next. Similarly legislatures, parliamentary committees, etc. convene
for a limited number of days or hours per term and competition for space on
the docket can be sti (Brauniger and Debus 2011, Alesina and Perotti 1996)
implying that only a limited number of issues can be subject to decision in any
particular period.
When decision-making capacity is constrained, a decision maker facing a
series of decisions that arrive in sequence faces a potentially complex problem.
2Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) preface their paper with a pertinent quotation from
Herbert Simon: \The scarce resource is not information; it is processing capacity to attend to
information. Attention is the chief bottleneck in organizational activity, and the bottleneck
becomes narrower and narrower as we move to the tops of organizations, where parallel
processing capacity becomes less easy to provide without damaging the coordinating function
that is a prime responsibility of these levels (Simon 1976).
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The constraint serves to connect decisions that could be treated independently
and separately in an unconstrained environment. When a new decision arrives
it has to compete for attention with unresolved prior decisions carried over
from earlier. Relatedly, in opting to postpone a decision, he will recognize that
so doing may impact what gets done in subsequent periods.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2 we develop
a stylized model of a capacity-constrained decision maker facing a sequence
of decisions that vary in importance and in improvability/urgency. In the
rst instance we characterize the solution to the decision maker's problem in a
three-period setting which provides our basic results and makes transparent the
mechanics. Section 3 considers a more general setting and Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
An agent faces a sequence of decision opportunities which we will refer to as
les.3 These arrive one per period with Dt denoting the one that arrives in
period t. Opportunities are time-limited { they have a `shelf-life' { and expire
after two periods. In other words, le Dt becomes worthless at t + 2. Most
of the insight from the model can be gleaned from the case in which there are
three periods (and two les) in the sequence: we treat that case in detail before
generalizing.
A le is described by two attributes. For leDt, we will denote by t  0 the
expected payo if the decision is made on that le promptly at time t (in other
words, immediately upon its arrival). This variable t is a measure of the scale
or importance of the opportunity. If the decision on that le is postponed to
period t+1 it delivers payo tt. For t > 1 the decision is improved through
postponement; if t < 1, the value of the opportunity decays over time. We
will refer to t > 0 as the improvability of the period-t le. Conversely 
 1
t
can be regarded as a measure of its urgency. The attributes t and t are
consistent with a variety of plausible micro-foundations. For our purposes they
are sucient to formulate the decision-maker's problem and characterize its
3We will refer to the decision-maker as a single agent (`he') but it could equally well refer
to other categories, including a committee or other collective.
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solution.
The opportunitiesDt over time are independent of each other. The decisions
might involve completely distinct issues and there is, for example, no a priori
complementarity between actions across decisions. We assume that t and t
are observable by the decision-maker at time t, in other words as soon as the
le arrives, but that the characteristics of future les are uncertain.4
2.1 Optimal Timing with Unlimited Decision Capacity
To provide a benchmark we rst consider the optimal timing of decisions when
there is no limitation on decision-making capacity.
For this purpose we can consider le Dt in isolation, irrespective of the
number of periods under consideration and whether or not the decision-maker
arrives at period t carrying a previously postponed le.
The opportunity described in the le lasts two periods, so Dt calls for a
decision either in period t or t + 1. That t is non-negative implies that it
is never optimal to allow the le to expire. A prompt decision has payo
t. Delaying the decision for one period has payo tt. The optimal choice
depends simply on the relative size of these payos (for the moment we abstract
from any time preference).
Result 1 With unlimited decision-making capacity it is optimal to make a
prompt decision (i.e., at time t) on le Dt = (t; t) if and only if
t  tt: (1)
Note that this result can be stated more simply: a prompt decision is op-
timal if and only if t  1, or that the project is not improved by waiting.
4At the cost of extra complexity the model could be extended to allow for (a) multiple
les to arrive per period and/or, (b) les to have a shelf-life longer than two periods. An
important implication of our approach is that in any period the number of unexpired les
carried from earlier can be no more than one. This implies that we do not have to worry
about dynamics that might arise if a larger portfolio of carried-over les were permitted. The
current set-up allows us to develop the key arguments without excessive notation.
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Importantly, in this unconstrained setting the optimal timing of decisions does
not vary with t, the importance of the le.
2.2 Optimal Timing with Limited Decision Capacity
When decision capacity is limited, even otherwise unrelated les become linked.
In particular the way in which it is optimal to deal with le t becomes sensitive
to what has happened in the past (in particular if decision on the prior le was
postponed) and expectations about the characteristics of les likely to arrive
in the future (in period t+ 1 and beyond).
In our three-period setting we limit decision capacity starkly, assuming that
the decision-maker can make at most one decision in any period.
Consider three alternative evolutions of decision points in this three-period
setting. In period 1 the decision-maker receives D1. He can either make a
prompt decision on that le or postpone it. A prompt decision on D1 leaves
him with a `clear desk' for the arrival of le D2 in the next period. In that
case, in period 2 he may act promptly on D2 or postpone it to period 3. In
contrast, if a decision on the initial le D1 is postponed, the decision maker
is left with a cluttered desk and a more complex decision in period 2: he can
either revert to the postponed le D1 before it expires (in turn postponing D2
to period 3), or can act on D2 promptly leaving D1 to expire. Depending on
what he expects future les to look like, postponing D1, failing to leave a clear
desk, can therefore be costly.
We evaluate the possible decision sequences backwards.
The choice in the nal period 3 is straightforward: if holding an unexpired
le (D2), the agent makes a decision on it, receiving 22.
In period 2 his choices depend on the state of (in)decision inherited from
period 1 and on the realized characteristics of the period 2 le, (2; 2).
First, consider the case in which decision on D1 was postponed to period 2.
If the new opportunity (2; 2) is revealed to be relatively unimportant and/or
non-urgent he might revert to D1, with payo 11, rather than let it expire.
This implies the postponement of D2 to period 3, at which point he anticipates
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it will be determined with payo 22. The total payo in periods 2 and 3 along
this trajectory is 11+22 (recall that we are ignoring any discounting).
On the other hand, if the new le D2 is revealed to be suciently important
and/or urgent then he will choose to attend to it promptly. This will deliver
payo 2 but imply the expiry of D1 (and leave him with no decision to make
in period 3).
To formalize this, when carrying unexpired le D1 in period 2, the payo
to the optimal allocation of decision capacity, contingent on realization (2; 2)
is
v2(D1; 2; 2) = max[2; 11+22] (2)
From the perspective of period 1, before the attributes of D2 are known, we
can dene the expectation over the distribution of (~2; ~2) to compute
V2(D1) = E [v2(D1; ~2; ~2)]:
V2(D1) is then the period-2 `continuation value' from postponement of decision
on le D1.
Alternatively, consider a prompt decision on le D1, which gives payo 1
and leaves a clear desk. The period-2 problem is then unencumbered, and leaves
a choice between prompt decision on D2 (yielding 2) or deferral to period 3
(yielding 22). The optimized payo is therefore
v2(; 2; 2) = max[2; 22]: (3)
Let V2() be the ex ante expectation of v2(; 2; 2): this is the continuation
value of a clear desk.
We can now address the period 1 problem, to determine how the decision-
capacity constraint aects the choice in the initial period. A prompt decision
on D1 pays 1 along with continuation value V2(). Postponement delivers the
continuation value V2(D1). A prompt decision on D1 is therefore optimal when
1 + V2()  V2(D1).
To allow comparison with the unconstrained benchmark, dene the dier-
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ence between continuation values as
2(D1) = V2(D1)  V2(): (4)
The optimal timing of the initial decision can then be summarized:
Result 2 With limited decision capacity, a prompt decision on le D1 is opti-
mal if and only if
1  2(D1): (5)
A comparison of Results 1 and 2 reveals how limiting decision capacity alters
the threshold that D1 must satisfy to merit prompt decision, from 11 in the
unconstrained case to 2(D1) in the capacity-constrained case. For further
discussion it is useful to dene the dierence between the two thresholds as
follows.
Denition (Value of a clear desk)
P (D1; D2) = 11  2(D1): (6)
A positive value for P (D1; D2) means that future decision-capacity con-
straints set a lower hurdle rate for prompt decision in period 1, namely 2(D1)
rather than 11 threshold when decision capacity is unlimited. The higher the
magnitude of P (D1; D2) the greater is the extent to which the constraint on
decision capacity implies a propensity towards early decisions.5
The value P (D1; D2) depends on the (known) attributes (1; 1) of the
current le D1 and the probability distribution of the attributes (~2; ~2) of the
future le D2. We can establish that P (D1; D2) is non-negative, leading to the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Limited decision-making capacity implies a non-negative pre-
mium to maintaining a clear desk, i:e: P (D1; D2) > 0, and (weakly) increases
the likelihood of a prompt decision on the initial opportunity.
5The relative sizes of the thresholds, 2(D1)=11, measures the proportional reduction in
the hurdle rate, an alternative measure that some readers might prefer. We adopt P (D1; D2)
because of its intuitive interpretation as the value of a clear desk.
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Proof: Using denitions (4) and (6), we can write P (D1; D2) = E[p(D1; ~2; ~2)]
where
p(D1; 2; 2)  11   [(v2(D1; 2; 2)  v2(; 2; 2)]:
Comparing (2) and (3) over various ranges of 2 and 2 we nd
p(D1; 2; 2) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if 2  22
(1 2)2 if 22 < 2  11 + 22
11 otherwise.
(7)
In each case p(D1; 2; 2) lies in the interval [0; 11]: this is obvious in the rst
and third cases; for the second this follows from the restriction on the range. It
follows that its expected value P (D1; D2) must also lie in the interval [0; 11].
If so, P (D1; D2)  0: 
This is intuitive. Having a clear desk is never in itself costly. A cluttered one
may or may not prove costly later, depending on the characteristics of D2 real-
ized subsequently, and the three cases delineated in the proof are illuminating.
(1) In the rst case, where 2 > 1, le D2 turns out to be improvable/non-
urgent to such an extent that postponement of a decision on that le to period
3 is warranted even if considered in isolation. In this case, a cluttered desk
does not impose any cost (or, equivalently, there is no particular value to hav-
ing kept the desk clear). (2) In the second case, decision 2 is not improvable,
so that the attributes of D2 do not, considered in isolation, warrant postpone-
ment. However, the cost of postponement is suciently small that { given the
constraint on decision capacity { it makes sense to postpone it and go back to
D1. (3) In the third case, D2 is suciently signicant and/or urgent that the
constrained decision-maker chooses to abandon D1 altogether. In the latter
case, while allowing D1 to expire is optimal ex post the decision-maker will
regret not having processed it earlier.
The opportunity costs of postponement lie in the second case (where limited
decision capacity induces inecient postponement of future opportunities) and
third case (where it leads to the abandonment of the initial opportunity). Case
(3) corresponds to the concern that \... there may never be a moment when it
9
makes sense to come back to it" referred to in the abstract.
The set-up makes clear how the preferred handling ofD1 is highly dependent
upon what future les are expected to look like. Recall that the magnitude of
P (D1; D2) measures the extent to which limitations of decision-making capacity
bias the choice towards prompt decisions. The extent of this bias depends on the
attributes of the current opportunity and the expected attributes of the future
opportunity. We characterize this dependence through a sequence of results
that assess how P (D1; D2) varies with the probability distributions from which
the parameters of future les will be drawn.
Result 3 Other things being equal, the greater the importance of the current
opportunity in le D1, the stronger the case for prompt decision. P (D1; D2) is
increasing in 1.
While this result seems intuitive, the specication in (7) is revealing. Here
the case for a prompt decision of the initial le D1 rests on the fear that
postponement could result in abandonment of the le.
Result 4 An increase in the expected importance of future decision opportu-
nities { a shift in the distribution of 2 in the sense of rst-order stochastic
dominance { increases the value of a clear desk P (D1; D2) and so makes a
prompt decision on D1 more likely.
Again, the specication (7) is instructive. It shows that p(:) is strictly in-
creasing in 2 in the second range and (and invariant to 2 in the rst and third
ranges). Here the value of a clear desk lies in avoiding sub-optimal postpone-
ment of future les. The expected value P (D1; D2) is larger for a distribution
that outranks another in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance over 2.
If future opportunities are likely to be more valuable then it is more likely that
a decision-maker who does not decide le D1 promptly will end up postponing
future decisions that were relatively urgent. More simply, a clear desk is more
valuable.
The decision environment in which an agent operates can vary in terms of
how `choppy' they are. In other words, to what extent are the les that appear
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similar in importance. What eect does the variability of the importance of
future projects have on the timing of decisions? Perhaps unexpectedly, we have
the following.
Result 5 An increase in the variability of the importance of future decision
opportunities { a mean-preserving increase in the spread of the distribution of
2 { decreases the value of a clear desk P (D1; D2) and makes a prompt decision
on D1 less likely.
Once again, (7) is helpful. As p(:) is concave in 2 in the relevant range it
follows, from Jensen's inequality, that a mean-preserving spread of the distri-
bution of 2 lowers the expected value P (D1; D2). Intuitively, if likely future
opportunities are more dispersed in value then postponement of decision on D1
is a little more desirable as it is more likely to be returned to for action later. In
a sense the ability to revert to a past decision provides better insurance against
low realizations of 2.
To study the impact of varying the distribution of 2, the improvability
of future opportunities, it helps to rewrite (7) to express p(:) over ascending
ranges of 2.
p(:) =
8>>><>>>:
11 if 2  1  (11=2)
2 22 if 1  (11=2) < 2  1
0 if 2 > 1:
(8)
Across the three ranges, p(2; :) is decreasing in 2 (it is weakly decreasing in
the rst and the third range and strictly decreasing in the intermediate range).
This leads to:
Result 6 An increase in the expected improvability of future decision oppor-
tunities { a shift in the distribution of 2 in the sense of rst-order stochastic
dominance { decreases the value of a clear desk P (D1; D2) and makes a prompt
decision on D1 less likely.
The intuition here is subtle. The greater the improvability of second-period
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opportunities, the greater the likelihood that these will be postponed to period
3. This dilutes the advantage to entering period 2 with a clear desk.
Finally, to complete the analysis we consider the impact of variability in
the improvability of future projects.
Result 7 An increase in the variability of the improvability of future decision
opportunities { a mean-preserving increase in the spread of the distribution of
2 { may increase or decrease the value of a clear desk P (D1; D2) and may
make a prompt decision on D1 more or less likely.
The ambiguity follows from p(:) being neither convex nor concave in 2:
its graph has a convex section in one range, concave in the other. As such it
is not possible to make categorical statements without additional restriction.
The worked example below will deliver a more precise condition for a particular
specication.
2.3 An Example with Uniform Distributions
To sharpen our understanding of the magnitude of these eects, we can obtain
a closed-form solution for a particular family of distributions.
We consider the special case where the two attributes of D2 are distributed
independently, and each distribution is uniform over a non-negative interval.
Assumption 1 The attributes of decision opportunity D2 are uniformly and
independently distributed.
(a) ~2  U [q;Q], where 0  q < Q;
(b) ~2  U [a;A], where 0  a < 1 < A.
The restrictions on the parameter range are minimal for our purpose. That
the lower limits of these distributions { q for the payo and a for the im-
provability parameter { are both non-negative ensures that the payo to the
opportunity is non-negative, even if a decision on it is postponed. That the
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upper limit for improvability A > 1 retains some richness to the setting by
ensuring that future opportunities may be, in at least some realizations, su-
ciently improvable to merit postponement. The choice of uniform distributions
allows us to compute closed-form solutions.
The Appendix details how P (D1; D2) can be evaluated for the distributions
specied in Assumption 1. To save notation, we dene I  11.
Result 8 Under Assumption 1, we have
P (:) =
8>>><>>>:
1
(A a)(Q q)
h
(1  a)(Q  q)I   12I2 ln

Q
q
i
if I1 a  q;
1
(A a)(Q q)
h
I(1 a)Q  34I2  14(q(1 a))2  12I2 ln

Q(1 a)
I
i
if q < I1 a  Q
1
(A a)(Q q)

1
4(1  a)2(Q2   q2)

otherwise.
It is straightforward to verify that P (D1; D2) is non-negative for each of
the ranges above and that it is weakly increasing in 1, the value of the initial
opportunity.
The closed-form solution also allows us to conrm the impact of variations
in the distribution of future opportunities, along the lines of our general Re-
sults 4 to 7. We consider small perturbations in the range of the distributions
specied in Assumption 1. In each case  > 0 is a small change that captures
a perturbation in the underlying distribution, broadly in the sense of rst-
or second-order stochastic dominance. The Appendix provides a proof of the
following.
Result 9 Impact of distributional changes on P (D1; D2). Consider  > 0.
1. A mean-increasing shift in the distribution of 2, from U [q;Q] to U [q +
;Q+ ] increases P (D1; D2).
2. A mean-preserving spread of the distribution of 2, from U [q;Q] to U [q 
;Q+ ] lowers P (D1; D2).
3. A mean-increasing shift in the distribution of improvability parameter 2,
from U [a;A] to U [a+ ; A+ ] lowers P (D1; D2),
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4. A mean-preserving spread of the distribution of 2, from U [a;A] to U [a 
; A+], increases P (D1; D2) as long as the expected value of 2 is not
less than 1.
These results mirror our earlier statements for the general case. In the last
case, where we had not been able to provide a categorical statement in the
general case, our special case with uniform distributions is more helpful. As
long as a+A
2
 1 { that is the future opportunity is on average improvable
{ increased dispersion of the improvability parameter reinforces the case for
prompt decisions.
How large is the eect of limited decision capacity, in quantitative terms?
Recall that we can think of 2(D1)=I as a measure of the relative diminution
of the hurdle rate from I (with no decision capacity constraint) to 2(D1)
(with constraint). We use Result 8 to compute numerical values for this ratio
for a particular set of distributions. We set 2  U [1; 100] to allow future
opportunities to vary considerably in their importance. We set 2  U [0:6; 1:8],
which implies that the future opportunity is positively improvable, on average
by 20%, with signicant variation around this average. For these distributions,
we nd that 2(D1)=I ranges from around 0.6 to 0.9, depending on I, the value
of the initial opportunity. Put simply, the restriction that only one decision can
be made in any period creates a relatively large bias towards prompt decisions,
with 10 to 40% reduction in the `target return'. These values are not overly
sensitive to our particular choice of parameters. In other words, a clear desk
might be quite valuable.
3 Generalizing to Many Periods
We can generalize the insights developed above into decision sequences that
last arbitrarily many periods. Given the potentially innite decision horizon,
we now allow for time preference, with  < 1 as the per-period discount factor.
Consider a setting with an arbitrary number of future les, Dt+1; Dt+2; : : :.
As before, each le is characterized by two variables, t  0 (its importance
or size) and t  0 (its improvability). The attributes of current les are
14
known; those of future les are uncertain but the probability distributions over
(t+i; t+i) are known at time t.
Again it is helpful to identify the benchmark for the optimal timing of
decisions in the absence of limitations in decision-making capacity.
For an isolated opportunity Dt, a prompt decision in period t has payo
t. Postponing the decision to period t+ 1 has payo tt, with present value
tt. In line with Result 1 we have:
Result 10 Consider an agent with unlimited decision-making capacity. It is
optimal to make a decision on le Dt = (t; t) promptly (i:e: at time t) i
t  tt: (9)
This is intuitive. Decisions that are suciently improvable (large enough )
are postponed and decided one period later. Those suciently `urgent' relative
to the discount factor { i.e. where 1=t   { are decided promptly.
This decision rule is optimal for any sequence of opportunities, : : : Dt 1; Dt; Dt+1 : : :,
as long as decision capacity is not limited.
3.1 Optimal Timing with Limited Decision Capacity
We now turn to the case with limited decision capacity. Once again we focus
on a stark version of limited decision capacity by assuming that our decision
maker can make at most one decision in any period.
Here the optimal decision at any time t may depend not only on the at-
tributes of the current opportunity Dt, but also those of any le carried from
the period before, and the decision maker's conjectures about the attributes of
all future opportunities, Dt+1; Dt+2; : : : :.
For presentation we distinguish between two cases, based on whether the
decision maker enters period t with a clear desk (no les postponed from pre-
vious periods) or a `cluttered desk' (with a le postponed from the previous
period).
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Starting with a clear desk
Consider a state in which le Dt = (t; t) arrives in period t onto an empty
desk (meaning that opportunity Dt 1 was decided promptly in the previous
period).
If the decision-maker decides at time t to address the newly-arrived oppor-
tunity, he obtains an immediate payo t and moves on to the next period with
a clear desk. Let Vt+1() be the continuation value of being in that future state
with  indicating, as before, a clear desk. Discounting future values, the total
payo to a prompt decision on le Dt is t + Vt+1().
If the decision-maker chooses at time t to postpone the decision on le Dt,
his immediate payo is zero and the continuation value, denoted as Vt+1(Dt),
incorporates the option of returning to Dt in the next period.
In any period t that starts with a clear desk, a prompt decision on le Dt
is optimal if and only if
t + Vt+1()  Vt+1(Dt): (10)
As before, we save notation by dening
t+1(Dt)  Vt+1(Dt)  Vt+1(): (11)
Relations (10) and (11) allow the following characterization of the optimal
timing of decisions:
Result 11 Consider an agent with limited decision-making capacity. Starting
any period t with a clear desk it is optimal to make a prompt decision (i.e., at
time t) on le Dt = (t; t) i
t  t+1(Dt): (12)
To assess how future limitations of decision-making capacity aect the
propensity towards prompt decisions for current opportunities, we generalize
our three-period model. From Result 10, absent decision capacity constraints,
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the required threshold for a prompt decision was tt. In the presence of a
decision capacity constraint, Result 11 tells us that the threshold is t+1(Dt).
Denote the dierence between these thresholds { the value of a clear desk
when facing a future sequence fDt+ig of les { as
P (Dt; fDt+ig) = [tt  t+1(Dt)]: (13)
It follows that decision capacity constraints will create a propensity towards
prompt decisions whenever P (Dt; fDt+ig)  0. As Proposition 2 shows, this is
indeed the case.
Proposition 2 For an agent with a clear desk, limiting decision-making ca-
pacity (weakly) increases the propensity to make a prompt decision on the le
that arrives.
The proof of this Proposition, a generalization of the proof of Proposition 1,
is relegated to the Appendix. In principle, the evaluation of P (Dt; fDt+ig)  0
is potentially complex because the continuation values Vt+1(Dt) and Vt+1()
depend on the entire sequence of future decision opportunities. However, as
the proof shows, the dierence t+1(Dt) between the continuation values is
bounded above by tt, which allows us to establish that P (Dt; fDt+ig) is non-
negative.
To gain some intuition on why t+1(Dt) is bounded above by tt, we must
analyze the implications of postponing a decision on today's le, in terms of
constraints on future choices. There are three scenarios. One, if tomorrow's
le turns out to be non-urgent, it can be postponement to the day after, so
that today's clutter imposes no cost at all. Or, it could be that tomorrow's
le might ideally call for prompt action, but the cost of delay is less than the
benet of clearing the inherited backlog. Finally, in the worst case scenario,
tomorrow's le might turn out to be so urgent and so important that it leads
to the abandonment of the current le, losing tt. In each case, tomorrow's
cluttered desk (as a result of today's postponement) causes a loss of at most
tt. Hence the expected cost t+1(Dt) < tt. As long as the support of the
distribution of future scenarios includes the second or third case above, the
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value of t+1(Dt) will be strictly less than tt.
There is another sense in which it is intuitively plausible that t+1(Dt) 
tt. A decision-maker who nd himself weighed down by past indecision can
voluntary abandon the previous le, whose value is tt.
6 The dierence be-
tween the two future valuations Vt+1(Dt) and Vt+1() cannot exceed this value.
Note that the results mirror very closely the arguments that we had uncov-
ered in the three-period model in the previous Section. This is not surprising:
given our assumption that all les expire after two periods, there can be at
most two les on the desk in any period, so the three period story suces.
However, there is one important aspect in which this general setting allows us
to go beyond the previous model. In a three-period model, the decision-maker
necessarily starts the initial period t = 1 with a clear desk. In contrast, when
analyzing a three-period interval in a sequence of arbitrary length, we can allow
the possibility that the decision maker nds himself with a cluttered desk at
time t, due to indecision in the previous period t  1. We turn to this next.
Starting with a cluttered desk: Backlog of past indecision
Consider the case where the decision-maker receives le Dt in period t but with
le Dt 1 still on his desk, having been postponed from the previous period. If
he returns to that le he cannot make a decision on the newly arrived one; if
he does not return to it the opportunity described in that le expires and is
lost.
Consider the payos to the choices. If he proceed to a decision on the
newly-arrived le Dt the payo is t + Vt+1(). If he reverts to Dt 1, the le
inherited from the past, the payo is t 1t 1 + Vt+1(Dt). A comparison of
these payos leads to the following result.
Result 12 Consider an agent with limited decision-making capacity. Starting
any period t with a cluttered desk (carrying unexpired le Dt 1) it is optimal
6It is a moot point that individuals are often attached to, even weighed down by, past
issues, over and above the realizable value of lingering decisions.
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to make a decision on the newly-arrived le Dt i
t  t+1(Dt) + t 1t 1: (14)
A comparison of Results 11 and 12 is revealing. One, as we would expect,
past indecision makes it less likely that new les will be decided upon promptly.
Prompt action towards Dt requires that t must exceed not only the future ad-
vantage from postponement { namely t+1(Dt) { but also the payo t 1t 1
to the expiring le Dt1 . In fact, given that t+1 is non-negative, it will never
make sense to address a newly-arrived le promptly if its payo is less than
that of the inherited le.
Once again, we can examine how limitations of decision capacity aect the
propensity towards prompt decisions. Absent limitations in decision capacity,
the optimal timing of action on le Dt is given by Result 10, with for prompt
action only if 2 exceeds tt. With limited decision capacity the threshold
is given by Result 12. When starting from a cluttered desk, the dierence
between these thresholds is
P^ (Dt; fDt+ig;Dt 1) = [tt  t+1(Dt)]  t 1t 1: (15)
Depending on the value t 1t 1, the expression P^ (Dt; fDt+ig) could be posi-
tive or negative. Our previous Proposition showed that with limited decision
capacity, a decision maker with a clear desk is inclined to be more decisive
towards current opportunities. The next Proposition, which follows directly
from previous results, spells out the obverse of this, that a decision maker with
a cluttered desk may end up being less attentive to current opportunities.
Proposition 3 For a decision-maker who nds himself at a cluttered desk,
limitations in decision-making capacity can decrease the propensity to react
promptly to le that has just arrived.
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3.2 Persistent procrastination
Some individuals and organizations have a reputation for indecision, always
postponing decisions on issues that arise. At the same time another decision-
maker facing seemingly identical stream of decisions deals with them all promptly,
always keeping a clear desk. It is tempting to ascribe the adoption of one de-
cision practice over the other to dierences in personality.
However our model can explain how these dierences might be the outcome
of rational calculation, and allow us to characterize the coexistence of such
behaviors as multiple equilibria that dier in their initial conditions.
Consider a sequence of les fDt+ig that the decision-maker knows to be all of
equal importance (that is, t+i =  for all i), and all opportunities are positively
improvable to the same extent (t+i =  for all i). In essence the attributes of
future opportunities are drawn from a common, degenerate distribution.
Assume that  2 (1; 1

). In the absence of any limitations of decision
capacity, in accordance with Result 10, it is optimal to act promptly on each
le as it arrives, given the restriction on . The same decision routine { to
decide promptly in each period { is also optimal with limited decision capacity,
as long as the decision maker starts with an uncluttered desk. To see why, it
is easy to check that that (Dt) =
( 1)
1   in this setting. If so, the condition
specied for prompt action in Result 11 { that t > (Dt) { is readily satised
with the assumed restriction that  < 1=.
At the same time, for a decision maker who starts with a cluttered desk,
the threshold for prompt decisions specied by Result 12 is never met for the
parameter values. In particular, the requirement that t > (Dt) +  is
never met for  > 1.
Put simply, a decision-maker who enters any period with a clear desk would
nd it optimal to make an immediate decision on a newly-arrived le, main-
taining such behavior in each subsequent period. In contrast, an individual
who nds himself with a cluttered desk would nd it optimal to address the
postponed le and leave the newly-arrived le to the next period, when such
behavior would be repeated.
20
Note that with a rigid rate of arrival of les (precisely one per period)
and decision capacity (no more than one per period) the equilibrium behavior
for our decision-maker could either be one of consistently prompt decision or
of consistent delay, depending upon the initial state. In a slightly perturbed
version of the setting, consider a decision-maker with a clear desk who receives
in some period two les, or the decision-maker fails to make a decision in
one period for whatever reason, the implied delay in processing one le would
imply postponement of all subsequent les. Conversely, a decision-maker with
a cluttered desk who is able to clear the backlog by making two decisions in
one period (say, by working a double-shift) would then nd it optimal to decide
promptly on all subsequent les.
We summarize this as follows:
Result 13 For mid-range values of improvability, in particular for  2 (1; 1

),
timing of decisions is history-dependent. Delay in decision making is persistent
as is promptness.
4 Conclusions
We have investigated the optimal behavior of a capacity-constrained decision-
maker who faces a sequence of decisions.
Absent a limit on decision capacity each decision can be thought about in
isolation. The decision-maker will choose to postpone a decision only if the
improvement in the quality of the postponed decision enhances payo more
than the cost of delay due to discounting. The timing of decision-making on
each le is independent of all other past and future les.
When a decision-maker is limited in the number of decisions he can make
in a particular period, his problem is more complex. If he chooses to make
progress on a newly-arrived le it might preclude his attending to a le carried
over from a previous period. Relatedly, if he postpones a decision on a newly-
arrived le he may not in the future have a time when it makes sense to come
back to it, in which case the payo opportunity embedded in that le may
never be harvested. Alternatively, he may subsequently come back to it, but
21
in so doing distort the timing of decision-making on future les in undesirable
ways. As such both past decision patterns and expected properties of the whole
sequence of future les need to be accounted for in determining the optimal
timing of decisions.
Our general nding is the recognition that future decision capacity is con-
gestible creates a bias towards prompt action towards current decisions. That
such a bias should exist seems self evident but we oer a method to under-
stand the dierent future scenarios that lead to this bias and to the quantify
the size of the bias in specic settings. We also study how the optimal timing
of decisions depends, in less obvious ways, on the probability distribution of
attributes associated with future opportunities. Making a prompt decision on
a particular le becomes more attractive when future decisions are expected to
be more important, since that makes it more likely that a le postponed today
might never be revisited. But that may matter less if future les are expected
to be more improvable, since even if an important le arrives next period it
is itself likely to be postponed. Interestingly, the incentive to postpone a de-
cision on a current le is increasing in how variable future les are expected
to be in terms of importance, while the eect of increasing the variability in
improvability (urgency) is in general ambiguous.
The framework also relates to the literature on irreversible choices in en-
vironments in which choice-relevant information is arriving (Arrow and Fisher
1974, Dixit and Pindyck 1994). By embedding the expected opportunity costs
to delayed action when decision capacity is limited the current framework pro-
vides a counter-force to the option (and quasi-option) values associated with
waiting.
The model we have presented has been stylized. It has allowed us to high-
light the key inter-temporal inter-dependencies that are thrown up when a se-
quence of decisions confronts a capacity-constrained decision-maker. A richer
version could, (1) allow for les that vary in shelf-life (or may not expire at all);
(2) model a decision body that could make more than one decision period but
subject to a cost either pecuniary or in terms of decision quality; (3) allow the
possibility of a backlog greater than one, allowing for varying degrees of `deci-
sion clutter'; (4) permit some degree of interdependence (complementarity or
22
substitutability) between les through channels other than via the constraint
on decision capacity. The precise extensions would depend on the specics of
the problems to be addressed, but we believe that our model provides a useful
way to organize such analyses.
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Appendix
Proof of Result 8
By denition P (D1; D2) = I  2(D1) where I  11 and 2(D1) is the expected
value of
2(D1; ~2; ~2) =
8><>:
I if ~2  ~2~2;
I (1  ~2)~2 if ~2~2 < ~2  I + ~2~2
0 otherwise.
We compute E(2) for the uniform distributions in Assumption 1 to evaluate P (D1; D2).
We have three cases, depending on the value of I relative to the parameters of the
distributions.
Case 1: I > Q(1  a) (ie., when the unexpired opportunity is relatively large.)
For ~2  1 we have 2(D1) = I, so
R Q
q
R A
1 2(:)d2d2 =

A 1
A a

I: For ~2 < 1, we
have 2(D1) = I (1  ~2)~2, soZ Q
q
Z 1
a
2(:)d2d2 =
1
A  a

(1  a)I   (1  a)
2
2
q +Q
2

:
Adding across the two ranges, and simplifying we get
P (D1; D2) =
1
(A  a)(Q  q)

1
4
(1  a)2(Q2   q2)

:
Case 2: q(1  a) < I < Q(1  a).
Once again, for ~2  1 we have
R Q
q
R A
1 2(:)d2d2 =

A 1
A a

I: For ~2 < 1, the
integral
R Q
q
R 1
a 2(:)d2d2 equals
1
A  a
1
Q  q

1
4
(I   q(1  a))(3I   q(1  a)) + 1
2
I2 ln

Q(1  a)
I

:
After straightforward manipulation,
P (D1; D2) =
1
(A a)(Q q)

I(1 a)Q  3
4
I2   1
4
(q(1 a))2   1
2
I2 ln

Q(1 a)
I

:
Case 3: I < q(1  a).
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Again, for ~2  1, we have
R Q
q
R A
1 2(:)d2d2 =

A 1
A a

I: For ~2 < 1, we haveZ Q
q
Z 1
a
2(:)d2d2 =
1
2
1
(A  a)(Q  q)

I2 ln

Q
q

:
Hence
P (D1; D2) =
1
(A  a)(Q  q)

(1  a)(Q  q)I   1
2
I2 ln

Q
q

:
Together we write
P =
8>><>>:
1
(A a)(Q q)
h
(1 a)(Q q)I   12I2 ln

Q
q
i
if I1 a  q;
1
(A a)(Q q)
h
I(1 a)Q  34I2  14(q(1 a))2  12I2 ln

Q(1 a)
I
i
if q< I1 aQ
1
(A a)(Q q)

1
4(1  a)2(Q2   q2)

otherwise.
It is tedious but straightforward to check that P (D1; D2) is positive in each range.
It is easy to verify that P (D1; D2) is (weakly) increasing in I. In the rst case,
it is sucient to check that (1 a)(Q  q) > I ln

Q
q

, or equivalently that Qq  
1   I(1 a)q ln

Q
q

is positive. This is of the form x   1    lnx where x > 1 and
 = I(1 a)q  1, which is always positive. A similar argument can be made in the
second case. In the third case, P (D1; D2) does not vary with I. 
Proof of Result 9
In each case we are looking at a perturbation of the uniform probability distribution,
either of 2 or 2, where the perturbation aects the range of the distribution. We
can captured these perturbations as a function P (D1; D2; ) and then investigate if
this function is increasing or decreasing in . The function is continuous over the
ranges of I so it is suces to check that the comparative static result holds over each
range.
1. A mean-enhancing shift of the distribution U [q;Q] to U [q + ;Q+ ]
For expositional simplicity, we write P () to capture only the terms in P (D1; D2; )
that vary with  associated with this perturbation.
P () 
8>><>>:
  ln

Q+
q+

if I1 a  q;
I(1 a)(Q+)  14(q+)2(1 a)2  12I2 ln

(Q+)(1 a)
I

if q< I1 aQ
(Q+ q + 2) otherwise.
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For the rst case
sign

dP
d

= sign

Q  q
(Q+ )(q + )

> 0:
For the second case, where (1 a)q < I < (1 a)Q,
sign

dP
d

= sign

I(1 a)  1
2
(1 a)2(q+)  1
2
I2
Q+

= sign
1
2

(1 a) [I (1 a)(q+)] + I

(1 a)  I
Q+

For  small enough, in the specied range the expression is positive.
For the third case, P (D1; D2) is obviously increasing in .
In sum, across all three ranges, a mean-enhancing shift in the distribution of
2, from U [q;Q] to U [q + ;Q+ ], causes P (D1; D2; ) to weakly increase. 
2. Amean-preserving spread of the distribution of 2, from U [q;Q] to U [q ;Q+].
Once again, P () captures only the terms in P (D1; D2; ) that vary with 
associated with this perturbation.
P 
8>><>>:
1
Q q+2
h
(1 a)(Q q)I  12I2 ln

Q
q
i
if I(1 a)  q;
1
Q q+2
h
I(1 a)(Q+)  34I2  14(q   )2(1 a)2  12I2 ln( (Q+)(1 a)I )
i
if q< I1 aQ
constant otherwise.
For the rst case, dierentiating P () with respect to  we have
sign

dP (:)
d

= sign

 x+ 1
x
  2 lnx

where x()  Q+q  : It is easy to verify that expression in square brackets in the
right is negative for x > 1.
For the second case, where (1 a)q < I < (1 a)Q, after some manipulation,
we nd
sign

dP (:)
d

= sign

1 m+ lnm+ 1
2
q 
Q+
(1 m)2

where m  (1 a)(Q+)I must exceed 1 in this range. Once again, the expression
in square brackets is negative. To see why, note that the expression is zero for
m = 1, and its derivative equals 1 m(1 a)(Q+) [I  (1 a)(q+ )] which is negative
for m > 1:
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For the third case, P (D1; D2) is independent of .
In sum, across the three ranges, a mean-preserving spread of the distribution
of 2, from U [q;Q] to U [q  ;Q+ ] causes P (D1; D2; ) to (weakly) decrease.

3. A mean-enhancing shift of the distribution of improvability parameter 2, from
U [a;A] to U [a+ ; A+ ].
Once again, P () captures only the terms in P (D1; D2; ) that vary with 
associated with this perturbation.
P () 
8><>:
(1 a )(Q q)I if I(1 a)  q;
I(1 a )Q  14 [q(1 a )]2  12I2 ln(1 a ) if q < I1 a  Q
(1 a )2(Q2   q2) otherwise.
For the rst and the third cases, it is straightforward to check that P (:) is
decreasing in . For the second case
sign

dP (:)
d

= sign

I

I
1 a  Q

+
 
q2(1 a+)  IQ < 0:
In sum, a mean-enhancing shift of the distribution of improvability parameter
2, from U [a;A] to U [a+ ; A+ ] causes P (D1; D2; ) to decrease. 
4. A mean-preserving spread of the distribution of 2 from U [a;A] to U [a ; A+
].
Here
P =
8>><>>:
1
A a+2
h
(1 a+)(Q q)I   12I2 ln

Q
q
i
if I(1 a)  q;
1
A a+2
h
I(1 a+)Q  34I2  14(q(1 a+))2  12I2 ln

Q(1 a+)
I
i
if q < I1 a  Q
1
A a+2

1
4(1  a+)2(Q2   q2)

otherwise.
For the rst case
sign

dP (:)
d

= sign

I(Q  q)(A+ a  2) + I2 ln(Q=q)
which is positive if 12(A+ a) > 1. For the second case the argument is slightly
more tedious but straightforward whenever 12(A+ a) > 1. For the third case,
the argument is simple.
In sum, a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of 2 from U [a;A] to
U [a   ; A + ] increases P (D1; D2; ) as long as the mean of the distribution
0:5(a+A) > 1. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
The key step is to establish that 0  t+1(Dt)  tt:
We can write Vt+1(Dt) = E [vt+1(Dt; ~t+1; ~t+1)], where vt+1(Dt; ~t+1; ~t+1) is
the optimized value of a future decision sequence starting at t + 1, conditional on
inheriting le Dt postponed from period t. Similarly, for the case where the decision
maker enters next period with a clear desk we have Vt+1() = E [vt+1(; ~t+1; ~t+1)]:
Then t+1(Dt) = E t+1(Dt; :), where
t+1(Dt; t+1; t+1)  [vt+1(Dt; t+1; t+1)  vt+1(; t+1; t+1)]:
To evaluate vt+1(Dt; :), when the decision-maker carries the backlog of Dt, consider
two scenarios. If the new opportunity Dt+1 turns out to be unimportant nor non-
urgent, the decision-maker reverts to Dt in period t + 1; given the constraint on
decision-making capacity, this necessitates postponing Dt+1 to period t+2. The total
payo in this case is tt + Vt+2(Dt+1). On the other hand, if Dt+1 turns out to
be suciently important and urgent, it would displace Dt altogether: the individual
will address Dt+1 in period t + 1, and enter period t + 2 without any backlog. The
total payo is t+1+Vt+2() for this case. Choosing optimally between these two
vt+1(Dt; t+1; t+1) = max[tt+Vt+2(Dt+1); t+1+Vt+2()]:
A similar analysis for the case where the decision-maker enters period t + 1 with a
clear desk
vt+1(; t+1; t+1) = max[Vt+2(Dt+1); t+1+Vt+2()]:
The dierence t+1(Dt; :) between these two state-contingent values depends on t+1
relative to t+2(Dt+1), as follows.
t+1(Dt:) =
8><>:
tt if t+1  t+2;
tt+t+2 t+1 if t+2 < t+1<t+2+tt
0 otherwise.
Note that in each of these three cases the value of t+1(Dt; :) is non-negative and
bounded above by tt. In the rst case, opportunity Dt+1 is such that a decision
on it is best postponed to period t+2. In the second case, the attributes of Dt+1 by
themselves do not warrant postponement to period t+ 2, but as that postponement
releases decision making-capacity to deal with Dt, it becomes worthwhile. Given the
restriction on t+1, it is easy to check that t+1(Dt; :) lies strictly between 0 and tt
for this case. The third case is simply the one where next period's opportunity is
so large that it is optimal to abandon Dt altogether: here the dierence in future
payos is zero.
If t+1(Dt; :)  tt in each of the three cases, so must its expected value
30
t+1(Dt) = E t+1(Dt; :) If so, P (Dt; fDt+1g) = [tt  t+1(Dt)]  0. 
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